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Abstract
We study the dynamic indifference pricing with ambiguity prefer-
ences. For this, we introduce the dynamic expected utility with am-
biguity via the nonlinear expectation–G-expectation, introduced by
Peng (2007). We also study the risk aversion and certainty equivalent
for the agents with ambiguity. We obtain the dynamic consistency
of indifference pricing with ambiguity preferences. Finally, we obtain
comparative statics.
Keywords: Dynamic indifference pricing, model uncertainty, G-expectation,
ambiguity
1 Introduction
Hodges and Neuberger (1989) introduce the concept of the indifference pric-
ing to study the optimal replication of contingent claims under transaction
costs. In Hodges and Neuberger (1989), the utility is defined by the von
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility. Since then, there are several works
studying the indifference pricing. The interested reader can refer to Hender-
son and Hobson (2009) and the references therein. Recently, Giammarino
and Barrieu (2013) study indifference pricing with uncertainty averse pref-
erences of Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011). However, Giammarino and Barrieu
(2013) study the indifference pricing in a static framework. The objective
of this paper is to investigate the indifference pricing in a dynamic frame-
work. In contrast to the static setup, we obtain the time consistency of the
indifference pricing for the agents with ambiguity.
This paper investigates dynamic indifference pricing in the presence of
model uncertainty, in which no reference probability measure is fixed, and
our priors can be singular with each other. We will study such problem via
the G-expectation.
Motivated by risk measures and volatility uncertainty problems, Peng
(2007) introduces a new theory–the G-expectation. Since G-expectation is
associated with a set of nonequivalent priors, which are not mutually abso-
lutely continuous, G-expectation is a nice tool to study model uncertainty
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problems in finance and economics. The G-expectation has many applica-
tions in finance and economics. For example, Epstein and Ji (2013, 2014)
study the asset pricing with ambiguity preferences. Beissner (2013) studies
the equilibrium theory with ambiguous volatility. Vorbrink (2014) stud-
ies the arbitrage theory in the financial market with volatility uncertainty.
Riedel and Bessiner (2014) study the Arrow-Debreu equilibria by continuous
trading under volatility uncertainty.
We first introduce the dynamic expected utility with ambiguity using the
theory of the G-expectation, and study the related properties, e.g., Jensen
inequality. By virtue of the dynamic expected utility with ambiguity, we
then study the risk aversion and certainty equivalent for the agents with
ambiguity. Finally, we investigate the dynamic indifference pricing with am-
biguity and study comparative statics. We obtain the dynamic consistency
of the ask price and bid price for the agents with ambiguity.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our frame-
work, and recall the theory of the G-expectation. In Section 3, we introduce
the dynamic expected utility with ambiguity, and study its properties. The
risk aversion for the agents with ambiguity is also studied in this section.
Section 4 investigates the certainty equivalent for the agents under model
uncertainty. In Section 5, we study the dynamic indifference pricing. Fi-
nally, in Section 6, we give the comparative statics.
2 Framework
Following Peng (2007, 2008, 2010), we recall the notions of the sublinear
expectation, the G-expectation and the related properties, which we will
use in what follows.
2.1 Sublinear expectations
Let Ω be a given nonempty set and H be a linear space of real functions
defined on Ω such that if x1, · · ·, xn ∈ H, then ϕ(x1, · · ·, xn) ∈ H, for each
ϕ ∈ Cl,lip(Rm). Here Cl,lip(Rm) denotes the linear space of functions ϕ
satisfying
|ϕ(x)− ϕ(y)| ≤ C(1 + |x|n + |y|n)|x− y|, for all x, y ∈ Rm,
for some C > 0 and n ∈ N, both depending on ϕ. The space H is considered
as a set of random variables.
Definition 2.1 A functional Eˆ : H 7→ R is called a sublinear expecta-
tion if it satisfies the following properties: for all X,Y ∈ H,
(i) monotonicity: if X ≥ Y , then Eˆ[X] ≥ Eˆ[Y ];
(ii) preservation of constants: Eˆ[c] = c, for all c ∈ R;
(iii) subadditivity: Eˆ[X] − Eˆ[Y ] ≤ Eˆ[X − Y ];
(iv) positive homogeneity: Eˆ[λX] = λEˆ[X], for all λ ≥ 0.
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The triple (Ω,H, Eˆ) is called a sublinear expectation space.
Remark 2.2 The sublinear expectation space (Ω,H, Eˆ) is a generalization
of the classical probability space (Ω,F ,P) endowed with the linear expectation
associated with P.
2.2 G-expectations
Let Ω = C0([0, T ];R) be the space of all real valued continuous functions
(ωt)t∈[0,T ] with ω0 = 0, equipped with the distance
ρ(ω1, ω2) =
∞∑
i=1
2−i
[
(max
t∈[0,i]
|ω1t − ω2t |) ∧ 1
]
, ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω.
We denote by Θ a fixed non-empty and closed subset of R+. For each ϕ ∈
Cl,lip(R), let uϕ be the unique viscosity solution of the following parabolic
partial differential equation:


∂u
∂t
= G(
∂2u
∂x2
), (t, x) ∈ (0, T ) × R,
u(0, x) = ϕ(x),
(2.1)
where
G(a) =
1
2
sup
γ∈Θ
(γa). (2.2)
Let B be the canonical process of Ω. We consider the following space on
Ω:
L0(Ft) :=
{
ϕ(Bt1 · · · , Btm) | t1, · · · , tm ∈ [0, t], for all ϕ ∈ Cl,lip(Rm), m ≥ 1
}
.
We can construct a sublinear expectation Eˆ defined on L0(FT ) as follows:
(i) For 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T and ϕ ∈ Cl,lip(R),
Eˆ[ϕ(Bt −Bs)] = Eˆ[ϕ(Bt−s)] = uϕ(t− s, 0).
(ii) For m ≥ 1, ϕ ∈ Cl,lip(Rm) and 0 = t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tm ≤ T , we set
Eˆ[ϕ(Bt1 , Bt2 , · · · , Btm)] = Eˆ[φ(Bt1 , Bt2 , · · · , Btm−1)],
where
φ(x1, x2, · · · , xm−1) = Eˆ[φ(x1, x2, · · · , xm−1, Btm −Btm−1 + xm−1)].
For m ≥ 1, ϕ ∈ Cl,lip(Rm) and 0 = t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tm ≤ T , the
related conditional expectation of ϕ(Bt1 , Bt2 , · · · , Btm) under L0(Ftj ), (j =
1, · · · ,m) as follows:
Eˆtj [ϕ(Bt1 , Bt2 , · · · , Btm)] = ψ(Bt1 , Bt2 , · · · , Btj ),
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where
ψ(x1, x2, · · · , xj) = Eˆ[ψ(x1, x2, · · · , xj , Btj+1−Btj+xj , · · · , Btm−Btm−1+xm−1)].
Let L(Ft) be the completion of L0(Ft) under the norm Eˆ[| · |]. Then the
operator Eˆ[·] (resp., Eˆt[·]) can be continuously extended to L(FT ) (resp.,
L(Ft). The sublinear expectation Eˆ[·] is called the G-expectation, and Eˆt[·]
is called the conditional G-expectation. The canonical process B is called
G-Brownian motion.
Proposition 2.3 For all 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T , the following holds for all X,Y ∈
L(FT ) :
(i) If X ≥ Y , then Eˆt[X] ≥ Eˆt[Y ].
(ii) Eˆt[λX] = λEˆt[X], for all λ ≥ 0.
(iii) Eˆt[η] = η, for all η ∈ L(Ft).
(iv) Eˆt[X] + Eˆt[Y ] ≥ Eˆt[X + Y ].
(v) Eˆs[Eˆt[X]] = Eˆs[X].
After the above basic definition we now introduce the notion of G-normal
distribution.
Definition 2.4 (G-normal distribution) A random variable X in a sublin-
ear expectation space (Ω,H, Eˆ) is called G-normal distributed, denoted by
X ∼ N (0,Θ), if for each ϕ ∈ Cl,lip(R), the following function defined by
u(t, x) := Eˆ[ϕ(x+
√
tX)], (t, x) ∈ [0,∞) × R,
is the unique viscosity solution of equation (2.1).
Remark 2.5 If we take Θ = [σ2, σ
2
], where σ2 ≤ σ2, and X ∼ N (0, [σ2, σ2]),
then Eˆ[−X] = −Eˆ[X] = 0, and Eˆ[X2] = σ2 ≥ −Eˆ[−X2] = σ2. which means
that X has volatility uncertainty. The interval [σ2, σ
2
] characterizes the
volatility uncertainty of X. If σ2 = σ
2
, then G-expectation is just the clas-
sical linear expectation.
2.3 G-expectations and multiple priors
Let W be a standard Brownian motion under a probability P on Ω, and
FW = (FWt )t≥0 be the filtration generated by W :
FWt := σ{Ws, s ∈ [0, T ]} ∨ N ,
where N is the collection of all P -null sets. We denote by AΘ0,T all the
Θ-valued FW -adapted processes on an interval [0, T ]. For θ ∈ AΘ0,T , let
Pθ be the law of {
∫ t
0 θsdWs, t ∈ [0, T ]}. The following proposition is the
characterization of the G-expectation.
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Proposition 2.6 For X ∈ L(FT ), we have
Eˆ[X] = sup
θ∈AΘ
0,T
EPθ [X].
Remark 2.7 The priors
{
Pθ, θ ∈ AΘ0,T
}
are a set of nonequivalent proba-
bility measures. For more details, see Peng (2007, 2010) and Epstein and
Ji (2013, 2014).
For θ ∈ AΘ0,T , we let
AΘ(t, θ) :=
{
θ′ ∈ AΘ0,T , θ′ = θ on [0, t]
}
.
We now give the characterization of the conditional G-expectation.
Proposition 2.8 For each θ ∈ AΘ0,T and X ∈ L(FT ), then for all t ∈ [0, T ],
Eˆt[X] = esssup
θ′∈AΘ(t,θ)
EPθ′ [X|FWt ], Pθ-a.s.
3 Dynamic expected utility with ambiguity
In this section, we introduce the dynamic expected utility with ambiguity
and investigate the related properties. We also study the risk aversion in
this framework. For this, we first introduce the superlinear expectation and
study the related properties, which will be also used in the following sections.
3.1 Superlinear expectations
For t ∈ [0, T ] and X ∈ L(FT ), we introduce the superlinear expectation:
Et[X] = −Eˆt[−X].
We denote by E[X] := E0[X]. The superlinear expectation Et[·] has the
following properties.
Proposition 3.1 For all 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T , the following holds for all X,Y ∈
L(FT ) :
(i) If X ≥ Y , then Et[X] ≥ Et[Y ].
(ii) Et[λX] = λEt[X], for all λ ≥ 0.
(iii) Et[X + η] = Et[X] + η, for all η ∈ L(Ft).
(iv) Et[X] + Et[Y ] ≤ Et[X + Y ].
(v) Es[Et[X]] = Es[X].
Proof: From Proposition 2.3 we can check the proposition holds. We only
give the proof of (iv). From (iv) in Proposition 2.3, we have
Eˆt[−X − Y ] ≤ Eˆt[−X] + Eˆt[−Y ].
Therefore,
Et[X + Y ] = −Eˆt[−X − Y ] ≥ −Eˆt[−X]− Eˆt[−Y ] = Et[X] + Et[Y ].

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3.2 Jensen inequality
As we know, the classical Jensen inequality plays an important role in eco-
nomics and finance. The following proposition shows that the Jensen in-
equality also holds for the model with uncertainty averse preferences.
Proposition 3.2 Let ϕ : R → R be a continuous, concave and increasing
function. Then, for t ∈ [0, T ] and X ∈ L(FT ), the following holds:
Et[ϕ(X)] ≤ ϕ(Et[X]). (3.1)
Proof: Let
∧ϕ :=
{
(a, b) ∈ R2| ϕ(x) ≤ ax+ b, for all x ∈ R}.
Then
ϕ(x) = inf
(a,b)∈∧ϕ
(ax+ b).
Since ϕ is increasing, we have a ≥ 0. From Proposition 3.1 it follows that
Et[ϕ(X)] ≤ aEt[X] + b, for all (a, b) ∈ ∧ϕ.
Therefore,
Et[ϕ(X)] ≤ inf
(a,b)∈∧ϕ
(aEt[X] + b) = ϕ(Et[X]).
The proof is complete. 
If ϕ ∈ C2(R), then we have the following proposition, which we will use
later.
Proposition 3.3 If ϕ ∈ C2(R), then the following are equivalent:
(i) The function ϕ is concave.
(ii) For all t ∈ [0, T ] and X ∈ L(FT ), the following holds:
Et[ϕ(X)] ≤ ϕ(Et[X]).
Proof: (i) =⇒ (ii) Using a similar argument of Proposition 5.4.6 in Peng
(2007), we can prove that (i) implies (ii). We omit the proof here.
(ii) =⇒ (i) For a ∈ R, we denote by
G(a) =
1
2
inf
γ∈Θ
(γ2a). (3.2)
From (ii) we know that, for all t ∈ [0, T ] and X ∈ L(FT ),
Et[ϕ(X)] ≤ ϕ(Et[X]).
Using a similar argument of Proposition 5.4.6 in Peng (2007), we have, for
all (x, y, z) ∈ R3,
G(ϕ′(y)x+ ϕ′′(y)z2)− ϕ′(y)G(x) ≤ 0.
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In particular, for fixed (x0, y0) ∈ R2 and each z ∈ R, we have
G(ϕ′(y0)x0 + ϕ
′′(y0)z
2)− ϕ′(y0)G(x0) ≤ 0. (3.3)
Since G(·) is a positive homogenous and superadditive function, then
G(ϕ′(y0)x0 + ϕ
′′(y0)z
2)− ϕ′(y0)G(x0)
≥ G(ϕ′′(y0))z2 +G(ϕ′(y0)x0)− ϕ′(y0)G(x0)
= G(ϕ′′(y0))z
2 + C,
where C = G(ϕ′(y0)x0)−ϕ′(y0)G(x0), which is independent of the choice z.
If ϕ′(y0) ≥ 0, by the definition of G in (3.2), we have
G(ϕ′(y0)x0) =
1
2
inf
γ∈Θ
(γ2ϕ′(y0)x0) = ϕ
′(y0)
1
2
inf
γ∈Θ
(γ2x0) = ϕ
′(y0)G(x0).
If ϕ′(y0) ≤ 0, using (3.2) again, we have
G(ϕ′(y0)x0) =
1
2
inf
γ∈Θ
(γ2ϕ′(y0)x0) = −1
2
ϕ′(y0) inf
γ∈Θ
(−γ2x0)
=
1
2
ϕ′(y0) sup
γ∈Θ
(γ2x0) ≤ 1
2
ϕ′(y0) inf
γ∈Θ
(γ2x0) = ϕ
′(y0)G(x0).
Therefore, C ≤ 0.
From (3.3) it follows that
G(ϕ′′(y0))z
2 ≤ −C,
for all z ∈ R, from which we get
G(ϕ′′(y0)) ≤ 0,
Therefore,
ϕ′′(y0) ≤ 0, for y0 ∈ R,
From the above we can prove that
ϕ′′(y) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ R,
i.e., ϕ is concave. The proof is complete. 
3.3 Expected utility with ambiguity
Definition 3.4 Let u : R → R be continuous, concave and increasing.
Then, U is called a dynamic expected utility, if for all t ∈ [0, T ], Ut :
L(FT )→ L(Ft) is defined by
Ut(X) = Et[u(X)], for X ∈ L(FT ).
Remark 3.5 From Proposition 2.8 we know that, for each θ ∈ AΘ0,T and
X ∈ L(FT ), then for all t ∈ [0, T ],
Ut(X) = essinf
θ′∈AΘ(t,θ)
EPθ′ [u(X)|FWt ], Pθ-a.s.
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The dynamic expected utility U has the following properties.
Proposition 3.6 For all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the following holds for all X,Y ∈
L(FT ) :
(i) If X ≥ Y , then Ut(X) ≥ Ut(Y ).
(ii) Ut(X) = u(X), for all X ∈ L(Ft).
(iii) For λ ∈ (0, 1), λUt(X) + (1− λ)Ut(Y ) ≤ Ut(λX + (1− λ)Y ).
(iv) For s ∈ [0, t], Us(X) = Us(Ut(X)).
(v) For s ∈ [0, t], if Ut(X) ≥ Ut(Y ), then Us(X) ≥ Us(Y ).
Proof: (i) Since X ≥ Y and u is increasing, then from (i) in Proposition
3.1 it follows that
Ut(X) = Et[u(X)] ≥ Et[u(Y )] = Ut(Y ).
(ii) From (iii) in Proposition 3.1 we have
Ut(X) = Et[u(X)] = ut(X).
(iii) From the concavity of u, (i), (ii) and (iv) in Proposition 3.1 we have
Ut(λX + (1− λ)Y )
= Et[u(λX + (1− λ)Y )]
≥ Et[λu(X) + (1 − λ)u(Y )]
≥ λEt[u(X)] + (1− λ)Et[u(Y )]
= λUt(X) + (1− λ)Ut(Y ).
(iv) From (v) in Proposition 3.1 it follows that
Us(X) = Es[u(X)] = Es[Et[u(X)]] = Us(Ut(X)).
(v) Since Ut(X) ≥ Ut(Y ) and u is increasing, then from (i) and (iv) it follows
that
Us(X) = Us(Ut(X)) ≥ Us(Ut(Y )) = Us(Y ).
The proof is complete. 
3.4 Risk Aversion
In comparison with the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility under
linear expectation, we study the risk aversion for the expected utility with
ambiguity.
Definition 3.7 A decision maker is risk averse if for all t ∈ [0, T ],
Ut(X) ≤ u (Et[X]) , for all X ∈ L(FT ).
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Using Proposition 3.3, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.8 If u ∈ C2(R), then a decision maker is risk averse if and
only if u is concave.
Definition 3.9 For t ∈ [0, T ], let u1, u2 be two continuous functions. u1 is
more risk averse than u2 at time t if for all X ∈ L(FT )
Et[u1(X)] ≤ u1 (Et[X]) =⇒ Et[u2(X)] ≤ u2 (Et[X]) .
Proposition 3.10 If u2(u
−1
1 (x)) is a continuous, concave and increasing
function of x, then u1 is more risk averse than u2.
Proof: Since u2(u
−1
1 (x)) is a concave and increasing function of x, using
Proposition 3.2, for X ∈ L(FT ) and t ∈ [0, T ], we have
Et[u2(X)] = Et[u2(u
−1
1 (u1(x))] ≤ u2(u−11 (Et[u1(X)]).
Since Et[u1(X)] ≤ u1 (Et[X]) and u2(u−11 (x)) is increasing in x, then we
have
Et[u2(X)] ≤ u2 (Et[X]) .
The proof is complete. 
4 Certainty Equivalent
Pratt (1964) introduces the classical notion of the static certainty equivalent.
We first study the static certainty equivalent, then we study the dynamic
case.
4.1 Static Certainty Equivalent
In this subsection, we study the static certainty equivalent in the presence of
ambiguous volatility. Let us consider a decision maker with ambiguity, who
has an asset x and utility function u (u is concave and u′ > 0, u′′ < 0). The
ambiguity premium pi is such that he would be indifferent between receiving
an uncertainty payoff X and receiving a deterministic amount E[X]−pi. The
ambiguity premium pi depends on x and X, and we denote it by pi(x,X).
Using expected utility with ambiguity in Section 3, we have
u(x+ E[X]− pi(x,X)) = E[u(x+X)]. (4.1)
For given two reals σ, σ with 0 ≤ σ ≤ σ, we suppose that X is G-normal
distributed, i.e., X ∼ N (0, [σ2, σ2]). From Section 2 and Section 3 we know
that X does not have mean uncertainty, i.e., E[−X] = −E[X] = 0, but X
has volatility uncertainty, i.e., E[X2] = σ2 ≤ −E[−X2] = σ2. Using Taylor
expansion on both sides of (4.1) around x we have
u(x− pi(x,X)) ≈ u(x)− u′(x)pi(x,X), (4.2)
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and
E[u(X + x)] ≈ u(x) + E[u′(x)X + 1
2
u′′(x)X2]
= u(x) + u′(x)E[X +
1
2
u′′(x)
u′(x)
X2].
Since E[−X] = −E[X] = 0 and −E[−X2] = σ2, we have
E[u(X + x)] ≈ u(x) + u′(x)E[−1
2
r(x)X2]
= u(x) +
1
2
r(x)u′(x)E[−X2]
= u(x)− 1
2
r(x)u′(x)σ2, (4.3)
where r(x) = −u′′(x)
u′(x) is the absolute risk aversion of Pratt (1964).
From (4.1),(4.2) and (4.3) we have
pi(x,X) ≈ 1
2
r(x)σ2.
The ambiguity premium of a decision maker with ambiguity preferences
depends on σ2, but does not depend on σ2. This is different from the classical
case in Pratt (1964). If σ2 = σ2, then this is the classical case.
4.2 Dynamic certainty equivalent
The objective of this subsection is to study the dynamic certainty equivalent.
From the dynamic point of view, a key notion is that of the time consistency,
which means that for any 0 < r < s < t ≤ T, the certainty equivalent
at r of X defined at t, can be indifferently evaluated directly or using an
intermediate time s.
Definition 4.1 Let u be a continuous, strictly increasing and concave func-
tion. Then for X ∈ L(FT ), we define the dynamic certainty equivalent
Ct(X) of X as follows:
Ct : L(FT )→ L(Ft),
satisfies
u(Ct(X)) = Et[u(X)].
Remark 4.2 Since u is strictly increasing, the above definition is well de-
fined. Clearly, we can write it as follows:
Ct(X) = u
−1(Et[u(X)]).
The dynamic certainty equivalent has the following properties.
Proposition 4.3 For 0 ≤ s ≤ t < T, and X,Y ∈ L(FT ), the following
properties hold.
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(i) If X ∈ L(Ft), then Ct(X) = X.
(ii) Cs(X) = Cs(Ct(X)).
(iii) If Ct(X) ≤ Ct(Y ), then Cs(X) ≤ Cs(Y ). In particular, if X ≤ Y ,
then Cs(X) ≤ Cs(Y ).
(iv) Cs(X) ≤ Es[Ct(X)]. In particular, Cs(X) ≤ Es[X].
Proof: (i). By (iii) in Proposition 3.1 and the definition of the dynamic
certainty equivalent, we have
Ct(X) = u
−1(Et[u(X)]) = u
−1(u(X)) = X.
(ii). By (v) in Proposition 3.1 and the definition of the dynamic certainty
equivalent, we have
Cs(X) = u
−1(Es[u(X)])
= u−1(Es[Et[u(X)]])
= u−1(Es[u(Ct(X))])
= u−1(u(Cs(Ct(X))))
= Cs(Ct(X)).
(iii). From (ii) it follows that
Cs(X) = Cs(Ct(X)) ≤ Cs(Ct(Y )) = Cs(Y ).
In particular, we take t = T and from (i) it follows that, if X ≤ Y , then
Cs(X) ≤ Cs(Y ).
(iv). From (ii) we have
Cs(X) = Cs(Ct(X)) = u
−1(Es[u(Ct(X))]).
Therefore, by Jensen inequality in Proposition 3.2 we get
Es[u(Ct(X))] ≤ u(Es[Ct(X)]).
From the above inequalities it follows that
Cs(X) ≤ Es[Ct(X)]
In particular, taking t = T and using (i) we get Cs(X) ≤ Es[X]. 
Remark 4.4 The dynamic certainty equivalent for X at time s can be ob-
tained in two ways. We can get the dynamic certainty equivalent for X at
time s directly. Also, we can first get the dynamic certainty equivalent for X
at time t > s, then get the dynamic certainty equivalent for Ct(X) at time
s.
Remark 4.5 For 0 < s < t ≤ T, if Ct(X) = Ct(Y ), then from (iii) we
know that Cs(X) = Cs(Y ), which means that the indifference of certainty
equivalent between X and Y at time s can carry over to any earlier time
s < t, that is, when less information is available.
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5 Dynamic indifference pricing
Giammarino and Barrieu (2013) study indifference pricing with uncertainty
averse preferences in a static framework. In their framework, it is impossible
to study indifference pricing in a dynamic framework. This section will
investigate the indifference pricing in a dynamic framework.
In this section, we give the definition of the dynamic indifference pricing
via the expected utility with ambiguity, which is studied in Section 3. We
also investigate the properties of the dynamic indifference pricing. In par-
ticular, we obtain the time consistency, which is a crucial property for the
indifference bid price and indifference ask price.
5.1 Indifference bid price
Definition 5.1 Let u ∈ C(R) be a strictly increasing and concave function.
For X ∈ L(FT ), bt : L(FT ) → L(Ft) is called the indifference bid price of
X with respect to the utility Ut at the time t if it satisfies
u(Y − bt(X)) = Ut(Y −X),
for Y ∈ L(Ft).
At time t, a decision maker is endowed with a monetary payoff Y ∈ L(Ft)
and a contingent claim X ∈ L(FT ) (a short position), which happens at
time T . The decision maker contemplates a transaction which allows him
to transfer the contingent claim X in exchange for paying bt(X) ∈ L(Ft) at
time t. The decision maker is in the position of the buyer of a policy, which
enables him not to have the contingent claim.
Proposition 5.2 For all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the following holds for all X1,X2 ∈
L(FT ) :
(i) If X1 ≥ X2, then bt(X1) ≥ bt(X2).
(ii) bt(X) = X, for all X ∈ L(Ft).
(iii) For s ∈ [0, t], if bt(X1) ≤ bt(X2), then bs(X1) ≤ bs(X2).
(iv) For s ∈ [0, t], bs(X) = bs(bt(X)).
Proof: (i) For Y ∈ L(Ft), since X1 ≥ X2, then from (i) in Proposition 3.6
it follows that
u(Y − bt(X1)) = Ut(Y −X1) ≤ Ut(Y −X2) = u(Y − bt(X2)).
Since u is strictly increasing, we have
bt(X1) ≥ bt(X2).
(ii) From (ii) in Proposition 3.6 we have, for Y ∈ L(Ft),
u(Y − bt(X)) = Ut(Y −X) = u(Y −X).
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Since u is strictly increasing, we have
bt(X) = X.
(iii) For Y ∈ L(Fs), since bt(X1) ≤ bt(X2), then from (iv) in Proposition 3.6
it follows that
u(Y − bs(X1)) = Us(Y −X1) = Us(Ut(Y −X1))
= Us(u(Y − bt(X1))) ≥ Us(u(Y − bt(X2)))
= Us(Ut(Y −X2)) = Us(Y −X2)
= u(Y − bs(X2)).
Since u is strictly increasing, we have
bs(X1) ≤ bs(X2).
(iv) From Definition 5.1 and expected utility with ambiguity in Section 3
we have, for Y ∈ L(Fs),
u(Y − bs(bt(X))) = Us(Y − bt(X))
= Es[u(Y − bt(X))]
= Es[Et[u(Y − bt(X))]]
= Es[Ut(Y − bt(X))]
= Es[u(Y −X)]
= Us(Y −X)
= u(Y − bs(X)).
Since u is strictly increasing, we have
bs(X) = bs(bt(X)).
The proof is complete. 
Remark 5.3 The property (iii) is called the time consistency of the bid
price. For 0 < s < t ≤ T, and X1,X2 ∈ L(FT ), if bt(X1) = bt(X2), then
from (iii) we know that bs(X1) = bs(X2), which means that the bid prices
of X1 and X2 are equal at time t, then they should be equal at any previous
time s < t.
5.2 Indifference ask price
Definition 5.4 Let u ∈ C(R) be a strictly increasing and concave function.
For X ∈ L(FT ), at : L(FT ) → L(Ft) is called the indifference ask price of
X with respect to the utility Ut at the time t if it satisfies
u(Y + at(X)) = Ut(Y +X),
for Y ∈ L(Ft).
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At time t, a decision maker is endowed with a monetary payoff Y ∈ L(Ft)
and a contingent claim X ∈ L(FT ) (a long position), which will be known
at time T . The ask price at(X) ∈ L(Ft) is the smallest amount that the
decision maker would willingly sell X ∈ L(FT ).
Remark 5.5 By Definition 5.1 we know that, for X ∈ L(FT ) and Y ∈
L(Ft),
u(Y − bt(−X)) = Ut(Y +X).
Then we have
u(Y − bt(−X)) = u(Y + at(X)).
Since u is strictly increasing we have
at(X) = −bt(−X).
From Proposition 5.2 we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5.6 For all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the following holds for all X1,X2 ∈
L(FT ) :
(i) If X1 ≥ X2, then at(X1) ≥ at(X2).
(ii) at(X) = X, for all X ∈ L(Ft).
(iii) For s ∈ [0, t], if at(X1) ≤ at(X2), then as(X1) ≤ as(X2).
(iv) For s ∈ [0, t], bs(X) = bs(bt(X)).
Remark 5.7 The property (iii) is called the time consistency of the ask
price. For 0 < s < t ≤ T, and X1,X2 ∈ L(FT ), if at(X1) = at(X2), then
from (iii) we know that as(X1) = as(X2), which means that the ask prices
of X1 and X2 are equal at time t, then they should be equal at any previous
time s < t.
6 Comparative statics
In this section, we give the comparative statics. In order to study the
characterization of uncertainty aversion, we use the notation Uu,Θt , where
t ∈ [0, T ], u is the utility, and Θ is the parameter which generates the G-
expectation Eˆ via equation (2.1). Moreover, the related ask and bid prices
are denoted by au,Θt and b
u,Θ
t , respectively.
The following notion of comparative uncertainty aversion in a dynamic
framework is similar to the definition of comparative uncertainty aversion
in a static framework in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), and Giammarino
and Barrieu (2013), and the definition of comparative risk aversion in Yaari
(1969).
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Definition 6.1 For t ∈ [0, T ], let u1, u2 ∈ C(R) be two strictly increasing
and concave functions. A decision maker Uu2,Θ2t : L(FT ) → L(Ft) is said
to be more uncertainty averse than Uu1,Θ1t : L(FT )→ L(Ft) if
u1(Y + Y¯ ) ≥ Uu1,Θ1t (Y +X) =⇒ u2(Y + Y¯ ) ≥ Uu2,Θ2t (Y +X),
for all Y, Y¯ ∈ L(Ft) and X ∈ L(FT ).
Proposition 6.2 For all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the following statements are equiva-
lent:
(i) Uu2,Θ2t is said to be more uncertainty averse than U
u1,Θ1
t .
(ii) bu1,Θ1t (X) ≤ bu2,Θ2t (X), for all X ∈ L(FT ).
(iii) au1,Θ1t (X) ≥ au2,Θ2t (X), for all X ∈ L(FT ).
Proof: (i) ⇐⇒ (ii) From Definition 5.1 and Definition 6.1 we know that,
for all Y, Y¯ ∈ L(Ft) and X ∈ L(FT ), Uu2,Θ2t is more uncertainty averse than
U
u1,Θ1
t if and only if
u1(Y + Y¯ ) ≥ u1(Y − bu1,Θ1t (−X)) =⇒ u2(Y + Y¯ ) ≥ u2(Y − bu2,Θ2t (−X)),
that is
− bu1,Θ1t (−X) ≤ Y¯ =⇒ −bu2,Θ2t (−X) ≤ Y¯ , (6.1)
where we use the fact that u1 and u2 are strictly increasing. Since (6.1)
holds for all X ∈ L(FT ), then (6.1) is equivalent to the following,
b
u1,Θ1
t (X) ≥ −Y¯ =⇒ bu2,Θ2t (X) ≥ −Y¯ .
Therefore, Uu1,Θ1t is more uncertainty averse than U
u2,Θ2
t if and only if
b
u1,Θ1
t (X) ≤ bu2,Θ2t (X).
(ii)⇐⇒ (iii) Using the fact that
a
u1,Θ1
t (X) = −bu1,Θ1t (−X), au2,Θ2t (X) = −bu2,Θ2t (−X),
we can easily get the equivalence of (ii) and (iii). The proof is complete. 
Proposition 6.3 For all 0 ≤ t ≤ T and X ∈ L(FT ), u ∈ C(R) is strictly
increasing, if Θ1 ⊂ Θ2, then
(i) bu,Θ1t (X) ≤ bu,Θ2t (X),
(ii) au,Θ1t (X) ≥ au,Θ2t (X).
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Proof: Since Θ1 ⊂ Θ2, then we have AΘ1(t, θ) ⊂ AΘ2(t, θ). From Remark
5.3 it follows that, for each θ ∈ AΘ0,T , X ∈ L(FT ), and for all t ∈ [0, T ],
Ut(X) = essinf
θ′∈AΘ(t,θ)
EPθ′ [u(X)|FWt ], Pθ-a.s.
Therefore,
u(Y − bu,Θ1t (X)) = Ut(Y −X)
= essinf
θ′∈AΘ1 (t,θ)
EPθ′ [u(Y −X)|FWt ]
≥ essinf
θ′∈AΘ2 (t,θ)
EPθ′ [u(Y −X)|FWt ]
= u(Y − bu,Θ2t (X)).
Since u is strictly increasing, then we have
b
u,Θ1
t (X) ≤ bu,Θ2t (X).
Since
a
u,Θ1
t (X) = −bu,Θ1t (−X), au,Θ2t (X) = −bu,Θ2t (−X),
we can easily get
a
u,Θ1
t (X) ≥ au,Θ2t (X).
The proof is complete. 
Proposition 6.4 For t ∈ [0, T ], let u1, u2 ∈ C(R) be two strictly increasing
and concave functions. If u1(u
−1
2 (x)) is a concave and increasing function
of x, then for X ∈ L(FT ),
(i) bu1,Θt (X) ≥ bu2,Θt (X),
(ii) au1,Θt (X) ≥ au2,Θt (X).
Proof: For X ∈ L(FT ) and t ∈ [0, T ], Ut(X) = Et[u(X)]. Therefore,
u1(Y − bu1,Θt (X)) = Et[u1(Y −X)].
Since u1 is strictly increasing, then we have
b
u1,Θ
t (X) = Y − u−11 (Et[u1(Y −X)]).
Similarly,
b
u2,Θ
t (X) = Y − u−12 (Et[u2(Y −X)]).
Thus,
b
u1,Θ
t (X)− bu2,Θt (X) = u−12 (Et[u2(Y −X)])− u−11 (Et[u1(Y −X)]). (6.2)
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Since u1(u
−1
2 (x)) is a concave and increasing function of x, by using Propo-
sition 3.2 we have
Et[u1(Y −X)] = Et[u1(u−12 (u2(Y −X)))]
≤ u1(u−12 (Et[u2(Y −X)])).
Since u1 is strictly increasing, then we have
u−11 (Et[u1(Y −X)]) ≤ u−12 (Et[u2(Y −X)]).
Therefore, from (6.2) we have
b
u1,Θ
t (X) ≥ bu2,Θt (X).
Since
a
u1,Θ
t (X) = −bu1,Θt (−X), au2,Θt (X) = −bu2,Θt (−X),
we can easily get
a
u1,Θ
t (X) ≥ au1,Θt (X).
The proof is complete. 
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